Collective Security and the Use of Force under the United Nations Charter: A Study of the Ezulwini Consensus
Keywords:
United Nations Charter, Ezulwini Consensus, African Union, collective securityAbstract
The paper critically analyses the consensus that reflects the common African position on the United Nations Charter. It explains the four elements of the Charter - the responsibility to protect and the legality of force. It also analyses peace enforcement, peace-keeping post-conflict peace-building and the African common position on these issues. The import of the revised version of collective security empowers the Charter to deal decisively with threats to international peace and security. Instead of economic sanctions that were automatic in theory but discretionary in practice, the Charter gave the Security Council the right to impose non-military sanctions, with all members obligated to accept and carry out the decisions of the Council. Against the background of these time-honoured practices, African leaders acting under the purview of Article 13 of the United Nations Charter and Article 41 of the AU Act and joining issues with the recommendations of The High-Level Panel of the Secretary General of the United Nations of 2003, revisited the concept of Collective Security and on March 8, 2005, under the aegis of the African Union jointly took a common African position on Collective Security and the use of force, what is known today as the “Ezulwini Consensus”. In its submission, the paper argues that though the consensus is a well-thought-out idea, its implementation calls for consensus, commitment and central decision-making machinery merged in a coherent and practicable Collective Security system backed up by a political will.
References
African Union (2005). Report of The Executive Council, 7th Extraordinary Session of The African Union, Ethiopia, March 2005, EXT./EX/CL/2/VII P.6.
African Union (2005). Report of the AU Common Position on The Secretary General’s High Level Panel Report – The Ezulwini Consensus, p. 86
Ayoob, M. (2004). The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict and the International System. Boulder, C.O: Lynne Rienner, p. 101
Bowett, D. (2002). United Nations Forces: A Legal Study. London: Stevens and Sons, p. 16
Claude, I. (1999). Power and International Relations. New York: Random House, p. 206
Dwich, W. and Blechman, B. (2002). Keeping the Peace: The United Nations in the Emerging World Order. Washington D.C.: Henry Stimson Centre, p. 26
Ezulwini Consensus (2005), African Union Report of the AU Common Position on The Secretary General’s High Level Panel Report p. 86.
Finkelstein, M. and Finkelstein, L. (1991). Collective Security. San Francisco: Chandler, p. 46
Goodrich, L. and Simons, A. (2005). The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institutions, p. 76
Hampson, F. and Malone, D. (2002). From Reaction To Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN United Nations System. Boulder CO: Lynne Riennel, p.8
Murphy, J. (2002). The United Nations and the Control of International Violence, A Legal and Political Analysis. Totowa, N.T.: Allanheld Osmun, 18
Stanley, R. (2004). The Secretary General’s High Level Panel On Security Threats, Challenge and Change: Maximizing Prospects for Success 35th United Nations Issues Conference. Harriman New York, The Stanley Foundation, p.5
United Nations (2005). The United Nations Secretary General’s High Level Panel on Security Threats, Challenge and Change, Official Report., p.21
White, N. (2006). The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security. New York: Manchester University Press, p. 10
Ziring, L., Riggs R. E. and Plano J. C. (2005). The United Nations: International Organization and World Politics. Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2024 Journal of Communication and Culture (JCC)
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.